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NOTES AND COMMENTS
cause of the legislation on books of account the legislature has also
demonstrated a willingness to trust the veracity of hospital records
made in the usual course of business?
The Hembree test does not take cognizance of the persuasive
arguments by the scholars in the evidence field. The Hembree test
in reality destroys a hospital records exception to the hearsay rule.
Under this test, a keeper of the records could not qualify the
records for admission into evidence because he could not testify
from his own knowledge that the records were correctly kept, nor
could he testify that they were made at or near the time of the
transaction to which they relate. Since the Hembree test requires
some personal knowledge of the entries, especially if their correct-
ness is an issue, the only resort for a litigant is to look to the people
who actually made the entries.
The leniency of litigants, and of the trial courts, in allowing
hospital records into evidence upon the testimony of a keeper of
the records, who has no personal knowledge of the entries contained
in the records, has forestalled the possible effects of the Hembree
and Altus cases. However, this leniency may not last forever. Some-
day the Supreme Court of Oklahoma may have to face an argument
that there is no effective hospital records exception to the hearsay
rule of evidence in Oklahoma.
Ronnie Main
MuNicAL CoRPoRAoNs: CRumLING WALL OF ToRT
IMMUNIM
"One of the mysteries of legal evolution"1 began with the
1788 English case of Russell v. Men of Devon2 where it was found
that the inhabitants of Devon were duty bound to keep a certain
bridge in repair and their failure to do so caused damage to Mr.
Russells wagon. In an action against the inhabitants of the
county, the court denied relief. Judge Ashhurst recognized the
principle that the law provides a remedy where there is an injury
by neglect, but felt that another principle prevailed: ". . . that
it is better than an individual should sustain an injury than that
the public should suffer an inconvenience." Other reasons were
propounded which were equally as convincing then, but not as
convincing today: there was a fear that by compensating Mr.
Russell an infinite number of actions would arise; there was no
precedent for this suit; there was no fund out of which the judg-
ment could be satisfied and the decision to impose liability of
this kind belongs to the legislature. The last argument is the only
argument from Russell used by today's courts.
iBorchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 4
(1924).
22 T.R. 667, 100 Eng.Rep. 359 (MB. 1788).
8 Id. at 673, 100 Eng.Rep. at 362.
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In 1812, the Russell case was used in the United States by
Massachusetts in the case of Mower v. Leicester.4 This was the
first of a long line of United States decisions which was to create
one of our most complex legal mysteries-municipal immunity from
tort liability. Relying on Russell, the court held it to be a well set-
tled common law rule that no action would lie against a quasi-cor-
poration created by the legislature. Russell did not represent such
a well settled common law rule. Later English cases5 say the
reason for denying relief in Russell was because the action was
against the inhabitants of a county rather than a corporate body
having funds out of which to satisfy a judgment. Supportingthis
view, Justice Pollock made this observation about Russell: 'We
think it clear, on the full consideration of that case, that the only
reason why the action would not lie was, because the inhabitants
of the county were not a corporation, and could not be sued .... -"
In spite of the English view of Russell, the courts of our
country have become more engulfed in the folds of the developing
mystery. After the Mower case, Bailey v. Mayor of New York 7
established the distinction between governmental and proprietary
functions of municipal corporations, and the application of this
distinction has put a burden on our courts that is both tiresome as
well as embarrassing. Recently though, nine states have laid aside
the burdens of municipal tort immunity. In each of these states
tort immunity has been abrogated as it applied to municipal
corporations and in some of the states, it has been extended to
eliminate the defense for all levels of government from the state
down through the municipality. Occasionally a court which has
abrogated the doctrine of tort immunity has had second thoughts
and has limited the effect of its decision by later judicial hold-
ings. This is so even though the justices seen to agree that the
doctrine is an anachronism and should be abolished. A major
stumbling block remaining is stare decisis which the majority
cannot ignore and the merits of which the minority can expound.
A companion argument to stare decisis is that the doctrine is so
well established by judicial opinion that legislation is the only
way to make a change.
The first of the recent cases overruling the doctrine of
municipal immunity is Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach.8 This
1957 Florida case held the city liable for the negligence of a police
officer resulting in the death of Mr. Hargrove. The court con-
cluded that there is no reason for granting immunity when an
individual suffers a direct, personal injury proximately caused
by negligence of a municipal employee who was acting within
49 Mass. 247 (1812).5 Borough of Bathurst v. MacPherson, 4 A.C. 256 (P.C. 1879) (New
So.W.); M'Kinnon v. Penson, 8 Ex. 318, 155 Eng.Tlep. 1369 (1853).
6 M'Kinnon v. Penson, supra note 5, at 327, 155 Eng.Rep. at 1372 - 1373.
73 Hill 531 (Sup.Ct.N.Y. 1842).896 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
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the scope of his employment. As early as 1850, the Florida courts
had held a city liable for the negligence of its employees9 and
this court desired to reinstate municipal liability and thereby
remove Florida courts from the governmental-proprietary quag-
mire. In disagreeing with the proposal that tort immunity should
be abrogated by legislative action, the Hargrove court said, "We
can see no necessity for insisting on legislative action in a matter
which the courts themselves originated." 0 As for stare decisis,
the court very concisely said: "Judicial consistency loses its virtue
when it is degraded by the vice of injustice." 1 Florida's de-
cision was a refreshing change, but was limited, for later cases
said this decision would only apply to municipal corporations,
and not to the state, its counties or school boards.'-
New Jersey abolished municipal immunity in McAndrew v.
Mularchuk'3 by holding the Borough of Keansburg liable for the
wrongful act of one of its part time policemen. Prior to this de-
cision the court would not impute negligence to a municipality
unless the act was committed by one of the hierarchy of the
body. Now, a municipality is liable on general principles of re-
spondeat superior, without regard to the employees position.
McAndrew disposed of stare decisis and the legislative argu-
ment by approving the position taken in the Hargrove case.
The California Supreme Court decided Muskopf v. Corning
Hospital Dist.14 with a penetrating decision written by Justice
Traynor. After condemning the foundation of governmental im-
munity, Traynor felt that a re-evaluatioii of the rule of govern-
mental immunity from tort liability displayed that it was mistaken
and unjust and should be discarded.' 5 le supported this state-
ment by pointing out that the doctrine had been eroded by
both legislature and courts, and 'he therefore felt this decision
was not a startling break with prior decisions. On the contrary,
he believed it was a logical step to conclude an established trend.
The defense here, like the defense in Hargrove, urged that
the legislature should make the break. It contended that prior lim-
itation' of the doctrine by the legislature constituted an expression
that there be no further change by the courts. Secondly, it urged
that the doctrine was so firmly established that only the legisla-
ture should effect a change. Answering the first argument, the
court. interpreted legislative action in areas of governmental im-
munity to mean that immunity was especially evil in those areas
9 TaUahassee v. Fortune, 3 Fla. 19 (1850).
10 96 So.2d at 132.
" Id. at 133.
12 Kaulakis v. Boyd, 138 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1962); Buck v. McLean, 115
So.2d 764 (Fla.App. 1959).
13 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960).
14 155 Cal.2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961).
15 Id. at 211, 359 P.2d at 458.16E.g., Wz.fs ANw. CAL. Gov. CoDE, §§ 53050 -53056 (1955).
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and therefore, should be abolished, leaving the remaining areas
for courts to make their own interpretations. Convincing logic
was used to answer the second defense. Immunity was not as
established as contended, reasoned the court, for the defense
of governmental immunity had been previously limited both by
the courts and by the legislature and therefore, this decision did
not drastically change the concept of governmental immunity.
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist.17 is another of
the modem decisions which limited tort immunity. The Illinois
Supreme Court dealt with a school district in this case but in-
ferentially applied the ruling of the case to municipal corpor-
ations. Later decisions show that inference was to be implement-
ed.' 8 Molitor echoed the Muskopf view when it arrived at the
conclusion that school district tort immunity is unjust, unsupport-
ed by any valid reason, and has no rightful place in modem day
society.' 9 This decision was supported by several reasons; first,
the doctrine as it stemmed from Russell rested on a faulty foun-
dation. Second, the rule that "the King can do no wrong" is
inapplicable to our basic legal concepts and especially inapplicable
to local government units. Thirdly, the court felt that since the
courts had made the rule, it was in their power to abolish it.
Lastly, it escaped stare decisis by saying it was a judicial duty
to mold the law to modem ideas of justice.
Next in the series of precedent making decisions is the 1961
Michigan case of Williams v. City of Detroit,20 which was a five
to three decision abolishing municipal tort immunity. There was
some confusion, however, as to what extent the majority opinion
went in overruling the doctrine of governmental immunity. Four
of the Justices spoke broadly of governmental immunity, but
Justice Black especially limited the decision to municipal im-
munity. Later holdings show that the decision was limited to
municipal corporations only and did not apply to the state or its
subdivisions. 21 justice Black summed up the status of arguments
concerning the retention of municipal immunity from tort liability
by saying:
"Little time need be spent in determining whether the strict
doctrine of municipal immunity from tort liability should be
repudiated. All this is old straw. The question is not 'Should
we?'; it is 'How may the body be interred judicially with non
discriminatory last rites?'. . . . The doctrine looks in vain
1718 1ll.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
18List v. O'Connor, 19 Ill.2d 337, 167 N.E.2d 188, 190 (1960); Peters
v. Bellinger, 19 Ill.2d 367, 166 N.E.2d 581, 582 (1960).
19 18 Ill.2d at 11, 163 N.E.2d at 96.
20364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961).
2 1 Lewis v. County of Genesee, 370 Mich. 110, 121 N.W.2d 417 (1963);
Stevens v. City of St. Clair Shores, 366 Mich. 341, 115 N.W.2d 69 (1962);
McDowell v. Mackie, 365 Mich. 268, 112 N.W.2d 491 (1961).
[Vol. 1, No. I
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around our conference table for a defender of its once alleged
merit."22
Like in Muskopf, the Justices wishing to retain the tort im-
munity doctrine, dwelled on the argument that such a change
should be made by the legislature. In answer, Justice Black ex-
pressed the feeling that the doctrine had devolved into a game of
basketball between judges and legislators with neither wanting to
make a final decision. Since the legislature had made no de-
cision, he proposed the judiciary should make a decision to force
an issue, for "the only alternative is inertia and cozy complacence
in our lofty quarters as 'the rule of law' burns slowly to utter
public disrespect."23 In defense, the City of Detroit contended
that if tort liability was imposed on them, it would be a crushing
blow to their treasury. The court saw little merit in this con-
tention because liability insurance could be obtained and was an
excellent method by which damage caused by municipal negli-
gence could be spread over the public at large. The majority evi-
dently felt the crushing blow could better be sustained by the city
than the individual.
Holytz v. City of Milwaukee2 4 completely abolished gov-
ernmental immunity in Wisconsin. Previous Wisconsin courts had
expressed dissatisfaction with the immunity doctrine and had re-
ferred the matter to the legislature,25 but it had failed to act
and the doctrine remained. Thus, this court felt that it must act.
After discussing the faults of the doctrine and demonstrating how
it had evolved into an anachronism, the court then abolished tort
immunity as "to all public bodies within the state: the state,
counties, cities, villages, towns, school districts, sewer districts,
drainage districts, and any other political subdivision of the state
.20 All political subdivisions of the state were made subject
to tort liability solely on respondeat superior, but the state re-
mained immune. The state had a second line of defense, for the
Wisconsin constitution directs the state to provide in what man-
ner and in what courts suits shall be brought against it.27 Since
the Wisconsin legislature has yet to pass legislation which would
apply to tort actions, the state, although liable, is still immune
from suit.
In December of 1962, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Spanel
v. Mounds View School Dist.2 8 eliminated tort immunity as a
defense for school districts, municipal corporations and other sub-
divisions of government; but the court refused to tamper with
22 364 Mich. at 231, 111 N.W.2d at 10.
23 Id. at 231, 111 N.W.2d at 12.
2417 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962).25 Flamingo v. City of Waukesha, 262 Wis. 219, 55 N.W.2d 24 (1952);
Britten v. City of Eau Claire, 260 Wis. 382, 51 N.W.2d 30 (1952).26 17 Wis.2d at 26, 115 N.W.2d at 625.
27WIS. STAT. ANN. Const art 4, § 27 (West 1957).
2S 118 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1962).
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state tort immunity. The veil of immunity was removed by break-
ing with precedent and reasoning that courts had the power to
alter the then existing rules of liability. Even though the court
did make the change through the exercise of judicial power, it
felt the legislature would have been the ideal place to effect a
change.
"A municipal corporation in Alaska does not enjoy immunity
from tort liability, whether the act or omission giving rise to the
liability is connected with either a overnmental or proprietary
function."29 With these words, Alaska s Supreme Court in City of
Fairbanks v. Schaible3" sounded the death knell for municipal
immunity. This opinion by-Justice Diamond explained that non-
immunity had actually been the tort rule in Alaska in territorial
days, but because of misinterpretation, the rule had not been
applied in recent years. According to the court's interpretation
of the early laws, they decided there was no tort immunity for
counties, incorporated towns, school districts or any other public
corporation.
A 1963 decision by the Arizona Supreme Court in Stone v.
Arizona Highway Comm'ni 1 seems to abolish immunity in that
state. There Ernest Stone brought an action against the Arizona
Highway Commission for wrongful death and personal injuries
caused by the negligence of the commission. In holding the com-
mission liable, the court made the government liable for the
tortious acts of its employees. This decision seems to effectively
abolish the defense of governmental immunity for all levels of
government. Since there have been no decisions limiting or over-
ruling the Stone case and the Arizona legislature has not spoken
on the subject, one can assume that governmental bodies in Ari-
zona no longer enjoy immunity from tort liability.
Looking at the cases discussed, one cannot deny that there
is a trend to abolish governmental tort immunity as a defense for
municipal corporations. For three years following the Hargrove
case, only one state attempted to significantly alter the doctrine.
Since 1960, seven states have spoken to eliminate immunity as a
defense. These courts have concurred in the abolition of muni-
cipal immunity, but they demonstrate a hesitancy to apply the
abolition to county and state government. Fear of treading in
the legislative realm often seems to be a pivotal factor. Some courts
feel restrained by state constitutions, by stare decisis or by the
fact that the fallacy of Russell does not apply as well to the
state. In other courts, dissenting justices have been vociferous in
asserting the idea that the remedy should come from the legis-
lature. These strong dissents plus the weight of stare decisis
29 City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201, 208 (Alaska 1962).
30 Id. at 201.
3193 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963).
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are often sufficient to prevent the extension of liability beyond
the precise situation before the court.
While the courts were vacillating, legislatures of several of
the states discussed above have played important roles in the de-
velopment of non-immunity. Some states helped implement judi-
cial action by passing complementary laws and in other states
the decision of the court was suspended or limited by legislative
action.
In 1959 legislative action in New Jersey made State and
private non-profit charitable, educational and religious associa-
tions and corporations immune from tort liability.3-2 In view of the
court's liberal attitude as expressed in McAndrew, it is interesting
to note that their legislature has not made other subdivisions of
government immune.
In California, soon after the Muskopf holding, the legislature
passed a law reinstating the doctrine of governmental immunity
as it had existed prior to this decision.33 This law was not a
legislative manifestation of an intention to retain governmental
immunity, for the law only suspended the effect of Muskopf for
two years.3 4 The legislature obviously acted in order to give gov-
ernmental bodies time to prepare for increased liability and to
give themselves time to formulate rules for the added liability. In
July of 1963, an act imposed tort liability on the state, counties,
cities, public authorities and any other political subdivision or
public corporation in that state.33 This act conformed with the
Muskopf decision, thereby giving legislative sanction to the ju-
dicial act.
The Illinois legislature took another view. It responded to
Molitor by declaring tort immunity for park districts,30 counties, 7
forest preserve districts,3 and the Chicago park district.39 Ap-
parently agreeing with the Molitor court in reasoning that school
districts should not be immune, the act made school districts
liable but limited their liability to $10,000.00.4 In light of the
public policy in this law-". . . that there should be a reasonable
distribution among members of the public at large of the burden
of individual loss from injuries incurred as a result of negligence
in the conduct of school district affairs ...."41-one might question
a monetary limit. Even though the legislature placed a limit on
32 N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:53A-7 (West Supp. 1962).
33 WEsT's ANN. CAL. Civ. CODE, § 22.3 (Supp. 1963).
34Ibid; see Coming Hosp. Dist. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 488, 370
P.2d 325 (1962); Donnachie v. East Bay Regional Park Dist., 217 Cal.App.2d
207, 31 Cal.Rptr. 611 (1963).35 WEsr's ANN. CAL. Gov. CODE, §§ 814-895.8 (Supp. 1963).HILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 105, § 12.1-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1962).
37 kL. ANN. STAT. ch. 34, § 301.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1962).38ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 57 Y2, § 3a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1962).
89 LrL. ANN. STAT. ch. 105, § 333.2a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1962).40ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 821 - 825 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1962).
411LL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 821 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1962).
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liability to prevent excess diversion of school funds, 42 it is not
consistent with a policy to distribute an individuars loss among
the public because an individual must ultimately bear a loss not
compensable by $10,000.00. This limit is especially inconsistent
when it is remembered that insurance may be available. By purch-
asing insurance, premiums would be a regular and anticipated
expense that would be evenly distributed among the taxed public.
The policies could be designed to fully cover most losses and
would thereby compensate without dealing an injurious blow
to the government treasury or an injured individual's pocket.
The Minnesota legislature accepted the invitation which was
extended in the Spanel case. In 1963 it imposed tort liability
on municipal corporations but exempted school and drainage dis-
tricts to the extent that those entities were not covered by in-
surance.
43
In Alaska, legislative action complemented judicial decision.
Following City of Fairbanks which abrogated tort immunity be-
low the state level, the Alaska legislature imposed tort liability on
the state.44
In viewing these statutes, it is evident that the legislature
did not express dissatisfaction with judicial decision. In some
states, a limit was imposed on liability; in other states, there was
a selection of public bodies which the legislature felt should be im-
mune, but in no state is there a total reversal of the judicial de-
cision.
Viewing legislative and judicial action as a whole, it may be
concluded that there is a significant trend to abolish municipal
tort immunity, but confusion still exists in two chief areas. First,
who should take the step toward abolition? Jurists who feel the
change should be legislative, contend the task is much too com-
plex for courts to handle. Those jurists who ask for judicial change,
reason that courts created the doctrine and can change it. They
recognize that legislatures have the right to change the rule of
liability, but feel legislative inaction does not preclude courts
from making a change. One fact does remain. No legislature has
reversed a judicial decision eliminating municipal tort immunity.
The second area of confusion lies in deciding to what levels of
government the abrogation of immunity should be applied. Some
states have lifted the cloak of tort immunity from all levels of
government and others have only lifted immunity from munici-
palities. There seems to be little or no consistency among the
states in abrogating the doctrine on levels of government higher
than municipalities, but one fact is evident-municipal immuhity
from tort liability has been eliminated in many states. Evidently
this "mystery of legal evolution" is no longer a universal mystery.
David Field James
42 Ibid.
4 3 Minn. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 798, §§ 466.01 -466.17.4 4 ALAsxA STAT. ANN., §§ 09.50.250-300 (1962).
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